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Abstract 
Email communication has been used for many years and replaces more and more traditional 
letters. Compared to postal service the mail service is easier, faster and free of charge. 
However, the standard email is from a security point of view comparable to post cards and not 
to letters. While end-to-end secure email communication is possible with PGP and S/MIME, 
only few people use it due to a lack of awareness, low usability, and lacking an understanding 
of PKIs. Recently, some new approaches for secure email communication have been proposed. 
In order to enable a comparison of all these different email services we define security, 
usability, and interoperability criteria and apply them to existing approaches. Based on the 
result, we propose future directives for usable secure email communication. 
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1. Introduction 
Ray Tomlinson sent the first network email in 1971 using the ARPANET.  With the 
conversion from ARPANET to the Internet in the early 1980s, email communication 
became broadly available. Since then, email has become more and more popular. 
Nowadays, email accounts are free of charge and much faster than traditional letters 
sent via postal services. Many people have several email accounts. Email replaces 
traditional letters more and more in many areas including in the private, business, 
and governmental sector. Critical, sensitive, personal and business information are 
sent via email although it is well known that emails are less secure than traditional 
letters. They can easily be forged; and provide neither strong sender authenticity nor 
message confidentially. Secure email communication is in general available i.e. 
based on PGP or S/MIME. These techniques are far from being broadly used. 
Studies like (Whitten, 1999) and (Sheng, 2006) show that these solutions are not 
usable. People in particular do not understand the concept of standard Public Key 
Infrastructures (PKI). 
Solutions for more usable secure email communication have recently been proposed 
to improve the situation. Examples are the E-PostBrief (http://www.epost.de), De-
Mail (https://www.bsi.bund.de) and Hushmail (http://www.hushmail.com/). These 
approaches do not provide end-to-end secure email communication but users need to 
trust the service providers. As in addition some of these solutions are closed systems 
and users need to pay for them; it is unclear whether they will be accepted like 
common emails. As an optimal solution for usable and end-to-end secure email 
communication is not yet available, users need to find an adequate trade-off for their 
needs. This paper defines the most relevant criteria that should be taken into account 
for such a decision. In addition we analyse existing security mechanisms in the 
context of email communication (namely DKIM, SPF, PGP, S/MIME and TLS) and 
popular mail service providers (namely Gmail, Hushmail, E-PostBrief and DE-Mail) 
according to these criteria. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we analyse related work. In Section 
3 we define the security criteria, which are applied to available security techniques in 
Section 4 and existing email providers in Section 5. In Section 6 we present our 
conclusions and directions for future work. 
2. Related Work 
There is little published literature that proposes criteria for classifying and analysing 
the security of an email system. We analyse this work and how it compares to our 
work: NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) published Guidelines 
on Electronic Mail Security (NIST, 2007). The guide “is intended to assist 
organizations in installing, configuring, and maintaining secure mail servers and mail 
client” (NIST, 2007). The guide is based on available technology and on assisting 
administrator and users to apply this technology in the most secure way. Our work 
proposes criteria independent from available email systems and technologies. 
Alperovitch et al. (Alperovitch et al., 2007) analyses some of the previous work on 
email reputation systems (systems that calculate a score for an email, usually for 
spam filtering) and provide a “taxonomy that examines the required properties of 
email reputation systems, identifies the range of approaches, and surveys previous 
work” (Alperovitch et al., 2007). While their work classifies and organizes a broad 
range of reputation criteria, they do not analyse whether current systems ensure these 
criteria. Garfinkel (Garfinkel, 2005b) focuses on usability aspects of email security, 
and includes a survey on how users act regarding signed emails. There are also 
previous works on usable security analysis of secure email systems (Whitten, 1999) 
(Garfinkel, 2005a) (Sheng, 2006), which provide important usability criteria, which 
we also consider on our work. 
3. Email usable security criteria 
This section defines the evaluation criteria used to later analyse existing email 
security techniques and email providers. They include security, interoperability, and 
usability requirements.  Due to space constraints, we leave aspects like malware 
spreading, spam, traceability, long-term authenticity and confidentiality, legal 
aspects and anonymous communication including aliases for future work. 
Security: The security properties are divided into sender authenticity (A), integrity 
(I), confidentiality (C), and one requirement addressing trust in the service under 
evaluation (Tr).  These criteria are deduced from our threat analysis of different 
email communication scenarios and possible attacks. We distinguish the following 
requirements: (A.1) It should be possible to verify that the sender is the owner of the 
email account that belongs to the stated sender email address. (A.2) It should be 
analysed which methods are used to verify the authenticity of the user i.e. password, 
two-factor authentication, or asymmetric cryptography (This authenticity 
information, especially how strong the authentication method was, are of interest to 
the receiver of a message. However, none of the later evaluated approaches provide 
this kind of information to the receiver.). This also includes whether passwords are 
securely transmitted or not. (A.3) It should be possible to deduce the real identity of 
the person sending the email. (I) It should be possible to detect modification of the 
content/the subject of the received email. (C) No one else except the receiver of the 
email should gain access to the content/subject of the email. (Tr) It should be 
analysed whether the user needs to trust the email provider or any other party like 
certification authorities regarding any of the security requirements defined 
previously. 
Interoperability: Interoperability is important, as services are not ready for large-
scale usage without it. Correspondingly, the sub criteria are related to security and 
trust aspects that are important for the acceptance of the corresponding service. This 
class of criteria is divided into the following sub criteria (Note, not all requirements 
are addressed here. Another one for instance is that the email service should provide 
all the functionality provided by standard email like searching in the inbox or 
accessing the account from different devices.): (IN.1) It should be possible to 
communicate with people who do not use the same email provider. (IN.2) It should 
be possible to securely communicate with people who do not use the same email 
provider. (IN.3) It should be possible to setup and run your own email service. 
(IN.4) There should be more than one provider offering the corresponding service. 
(IN.5) It should be possible to use the system with the security techniques discussed 
in Section 4. 
Usability aspects: The usability criteria are deduced from papers on usable security 
analysis of email communication systems. The most important are: (U.1) It should be 
evaluated how much work is necessary to setup and start using the service. (U.2) 
Adequate metaphors should be used for functions like encryption, signing, and 
certificates. (U.3) It should only require less and easy to make trust decisions. (U.4) 
Sender and receiver should not need to understand the underlying PKI concepts to 
make any trust decisions. (U.5) It should not be necessary to obtain and/or compare 
some information via out of bounds mode like comparing hashes. 
4. Security techniques available for email 
In this section we describe the security techniques that are currently available and 
could be used to improve email security by integrating them in existing email 
services or by installing a corresponding plugin into the email client or web browser. 
The list contains techniques related to sender authentication, Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) support, and securing the network.  We analyse which of the 
above security and usability criteria they fulfil while we only discuss those security 
requirements that are at least partially ensured and only those usability requirements 
that can be applied but are not fulfilled. We also do not address interoperability 
requirements as the analysed techniques do not stand on their own but can only be 
used as an add-on to the email services discussed in Section 5. For all techniques we 
make the trust assumption (Tr) that the software running the corresponding security 
operations and checks is trustworthy, and that cryptographic secret keys are securely 
stored. 
An SPF (Sender Policy Framework) (RFC4408) record is a list of IP addresses that 
are authorized to send emails for a particular domain. The DNS server responsible 
for this domain publishes this list. This list can be used to partially verify the 
authenticity of a received email, confirming that it came from an authorized server. If 
we trust the DNS server regarding the integrity of this list and the email provider 
behind this domain (Tr), i.e. the provider only delivers emails from authenticated 
users with the correct address in the “from” field, and there is also no MITM attack 
(A Man-In-The-Middle attack could modify the list since it is not authenticated.) 
when fetching the list, A.1 is ensured. However since this assumption is not true for 
all DNS servers and all mail providers, hard trust decisions remain for the user (U.3). 
Sender ID Framework - SIDF (RFC4406) extends the SPF verification, but with no 
relevant improvements considering our criteria. DKIM (Domain Keys Identified 
Mail) (RFC4871) is a digital signature from the email service provider on sent 
emails. It allows verifying that this provider really sent the message. The 
corresponding public key is published on the DNS server associated to this domain. 
Thus, regarding A.1, one needs to trust that the DNS server provides the proper key 
and that the email service only delivers emails from authenticated users. 
Correspondingly, the trust assumptions (Tr) regarding A.1 and the limitations for U.3 
identified for SPF also hold for DKIM, including the non-occurrence of a MITM 
attack (In this case the MITM attack could be used to inform the wrong key to the 
receiver). In addition, the integrity property (I) is partially ensured because the 
signature provides message integrity after being processed by the mail server of the 
sender under the same trust assumption required for A.1. 
PGP (Pretty good Privacy) (RFC2015) provides end-to-end security to email 
messages. It is not necessary to trust a central trust anchor as it is based on the Web-
of-Trust (WoT) model.  It fulfils property C and I. Authenticity depends on the 
adequate use of the WoT. In a restricted environment where people verify carefully 
the keys they sign, A.1 and even A.2 can be considered as fulfilled, but with the cost 
of hard trust decisions (conflict with U.3) and the fact that out-of-bounds data (i.e. 
verifying key hashes before setting keys as trusted) is required (conflict with U.5). 
PGP requires some PKI understanding (conflict with U.4) and it takes a while to get 
started (conflict with U.1). Adequate metaphors (U.2) are very important for a user 
friendly implementation of PGP, while studies (Whitten, 1999) (Garfinkel, 2005a) 
showed that this is not the case for PGP (conflict with U.2). S/MIME 
(Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) (RFC2311) provides end-to-end 
security to email messages. It is based on X.509 PKIs. A certificate for a 
corresponding key pair should be obtained from a trusted Certification Authority 
(CA) which is usually not free of charge. However, the use of self-signed certificates 
is also possible. S/MIME with CAs fulfils A.1, C and I, and if the CA also verifies 
the personal identity (i.e. for Qualified Certificates on E.U. (RFC3739)) it fulfils A.2, 
as well. The receiver needs to trust the CA that issued the certificate of the sender 
(Tr). While major CAs are already set as trusted on most plugins, it leads to hard 
trust decisions if the sender's certificate is issued on an untrusted/unknown CA 
(conflict with U.3). Without CAs (self-signed certificates), S/MIME only fulfils C 
and I. In this case it is hard to decide if the authenticity of the message should or 
should not be trusted (conflict with U.3). The user needs out-of-bounds information 
to verify the authenticity (conflict with U.5). In both cases, it takes a while to get 
started (conflict with U.1). Similar to PGP, adequate metaphors are very important 
for a user-friendly implementation. In addition, in cases in which the verification 
fails (i.e. failure on obtaining revocation information, or an intermediate CA 
certificate), it is required to understand the underlying PKI (conflict with U.4). 
Opportunistic Encryption (RFC4322) in general means that a system tries to use 
encryption to secure any communication, while using unencrypted communication if 
corresponding keys are not available. The keys are not necessarily authenticated. 
Thus, if there is any known key to communicate with the receiver (even in a self-
signed certificate) encryption is used. Garfinkel (Garfinkel, 2003) proposed a system 
that implements opportunistic encryption for email communication. It acts like a 
proxy for sending and a proxy for receiving an email (While he does not provide 
clear information about the proxy, we assume that it runs as a plugin locally and is 
considered trusted (Tr).). The proxy manages the keys (including certificates), the 
encryption and the decryption process. Whenever the sending proxy is able to 
encrypt an email to the receiver, it will encrypt this message. It is also possible to 
specify that a message should only be delivered if it can be encrypted. There is no 
authentication of the keys in the system. The receiver proxy learns new keys from 
emails previously received and stores them in its own database. It gives a warning 
only if a new key is detected for an already-known email address. Furthermore, 
emails are not signed. It therefore provides confidentiality (C) under the trust 
assumption (Tr) that the proxy is trustworthy (i.e. a local proxy) and there was a 
previous legitimate communication between sender and receiver so the correct key is 
known. This idea avoids the need to understand PKI concepts (U.4 is ensured) and 
hard trust decisions (U.3 and U.5 is in general ensured - except when a conflict 
occurs). There is also a low setup effort (U.1). 
TLS (Transport Layer Security) provides a secure communication between user and 
server (over IMAP, POP, SMTP or a Webmail session) and between servers. 
Confidentiality (C) and integrity (I) are ensured under the trust assumption (Tr) that 
the whole delivery process is secured by TLS and that the servers are trustworthy.  It 
could also be used to authenticate the user with TLS client authentication (therefore 
offering strong authentication - A.2), but that is not common. 
5. Analysis of existing secure email providers 
In this section, we analyse five types of email providers according to our criteria 
while focusing on one representative of each; namely standard (in-secure) email 
providers, very popular email providers providing some security (Gmail), a 
combination of the previous and the different PKI approaches from Section 4, 
providers offering secure email communication in a closed system (DE-Mail/E-
Postbrief), and providers offering secure email communication in an open system 
(Hushmail). The results of the comparison are summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
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Table 1 - E-mail services and security criteria 
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Table 2 - E-mail services and usability criteria 
 IN.1 IN.2 IN.3 IN.4 IN.5 
Gmail Yes Yes Open standards Open standards PGP, S/MIME 
DE-Mail Closed environ. Closed environ. High cost High cost PGP/S/MIME 
E-PostBr. Closed environ. Closed environ. Closed environ. No PGP/S/MIME 
Hushmail Yes Yes Open standards Open standards DKIM/SPF/ 
S/MIME 
Table 3 - E-mail services and interoperability criteria 
5.1. Standard email 
According to the email standards (RFC5322, RFC5321), standard email services are 
not required to provide too much security information to the receiver. The only 
somehow relevant security information is the header of an email which provides 
information regarding the delivery path of this message, but this information is not 
authenticated, therefore any decision based on it depends on assuming all the servers 
on the path trustworthy. However these assumptions are hard to verify and rely on 
too many out-of-bounds information (conflict with U.5) and hard trust decisions 
(conflict with U.3), and also are not true for many servers. Many email providers 
operate using no more security than those offered by these standards. 
5.2. Gmail 
The most popular email providers usually offer at least some security improvements, 
even if mainly for spam control. We have chosen to analyse Gmail, which verifies 
SPF and DKIM for email origin authentication, and adds DKIM signatures for 
emails delivered. When an email has SPF or DKIM authentication but the domain in 
the address (“from” field) does not match the authenticated origin information, this is 
shown to the end user as a “via authenticated origin domain” after the sender's 
address. Emails sent from forged Gmail accounts (i.e. from other servers, but with 
Gmail address on the “from” field), which as a result do not have authenticated 
information on their origin, are shown to the receiving Gmail user with a warning 
“this message may not have been sent by: email@domain.com”, in red). This makes 
impersonating other Gmail accounts difficult. 
Emails from domains other than Google and without SPF and without DKIM 
authentication are shown without any hint or warning. The only difference between a 
non-authenticated and an authenticated mail is that the authenticated domain is 
shown as “mailed-by” when the user looks at the details of the message header. 
There is no other visual clue that differentiates an SPF/DKIM authentic message 
from one without any authentication. Therefore, Gmail only guarantees email proof 
of possession (A.1) between Gmail users, considering Gmail trustworthy (Tr). When 
communicating with other service providers, the interface does not show adequate 
feedback, but even with more information provided it would lead to complex trust 
decisions (conflicts with U.3), namely deciding if the authenticated domain is 
trustworthy or not. Gmail supports two-factor authentication (using a smartphone 
application that generates “One Time Passwords”) but this is not enforced (A.2) and 
not visible to the receiver. Emails originated from Gmail servers are DKIM signed, 
therefore have their integrity guaranteed (I), considering Gmail trustworthy (Tr).  
Gmail uses SSL/TLS for end-to-server encryption, and may use it also to 
communicate with other servers when supported, however even trusting Gmail it is 
not possible to guarantee confidentiality of messages after they leave Gmail servers. 
Therefore, (C) is only partially fulfilled. The communication between user and server 
is encrypted during the authentication process (A.2). 
Gmail uses only open standards and is a standard mail provider (IN.1). All the 
security measures available are also based on open standards and may be used by 
other providers, so it is possible to have the same level of secure email 
communication with any other interested provider (IN.2).  While there is only one 
provider of the Gmail solution, we consider IN.4 and IN.5 fulfilled because there is 
no restriction to operate a similar service once it is based on open standards. It is also 
possible to integrate PGP and or S/MIME on Gmail (there are even plugins available 
for that - i.e. FireGPG and Penango), therefore IN.5 is also fulfilled. 
5.3. DE-Mail/E-PostBrief 
DE-Mail and E-PostBrief are closed messaging systems, provided by the German 
government and German postal services. These approaches claim to provide secure 
email communication and are based on strictly controlled servers that manage the 
full delivery process. There is also a law regulating DE-Mail. Both systems are 
closed environments. Thus there is no possibility to forge a message (A.1), if the 
providers are considered trustworthy (Tr). Users are only allowed to use the system 
after a personal identification (A.3) at the provider's office (DE-Mail) or at a postal 
service centre (E-PostBrief). E-PostBrief provides SMS TAN (a one-time-password 
sent via SMS) as a second factor of authentication, but its use is neither enforced 
(A.2) nor available to the receiver. There is no information available whether DE-
Mail providers will offer this possibility. The communication between different 
servers of one provider and servers from different providers (in particular within the 
DE-Mail concept) are secured by TLS. TLS is also used to provide end-to-server 
security.  Correspondingly, integrity (I) and confidentiality (C) are fulfilled based on 
trust in the provider(s) (Tr). Besides the costs for each email (both services require 
payment per message sent), interoperability is the greatest disadvantage of these two 
approaches. Due to their closed environment property, it is only possible to 
communicate with people who have an account in this environment (IN.1 and IN.2 
are not ensured). While there are some providers in DE-Mail, the number is limited 
number (IN.4 insured) though it is possible to operate your own provider (with high 
costs involved - IN.3 ensured). It could be possible to use other techniques (IN.5), 
particularly PGP and S/MIME to provide end-to-end security, using corresponding 
plugins. 
5.4. Hushmail 
Hushmail is a web-based solution (It is also possible to use a Java applet to 
download the encrypted key and process the encryption operations locally. However 
the same trust assumptions hold for the Java version, since Hushmail provides it. 
Hushmail is also testing a new interface, but it is not stable. Therefore our evaluation 
considers the old (“original”) interface.). Hushmail calls itself a PGP based secure 
email system. However, the main characteristic of PGP, namely the WoT model, is 
not applied. Instead, Hushmail signs all the public keys of the users and publishes 
them on a key server. Obviously, all keys signed by Hushmail are considered 
trustworthy. With this approach, it is possible to automate the key trust management 
process and in particular the user is no longer involved. A Hushmail server generates 
the user’s key pairs and the secret key is encrypted with the user email account 
password. In addition, everyone is able to publish new PGP keys on the key server, 
associated to email addresses from other email providers besides Hushmail. In that 
case, there is a challenge-response mail sent to the email associated with the key to 
verify the ownership of the account before the key is set as trusted for all Hushmail 
users. It is also possible to send secure emails to non-Hushmail accounts for which 
no PGP key is stored on the Hushmail key server, based on Question/Answer that 
only the receiver should be able to answer. 
For all received signed emails for which the corresponding public key is trusted by 
Hushmail, the signature is verified and if the email is properly signed the email is 
shown as having valid signatures (“This message is encrypted, and is digitally signed 
by Sender Name <username@domain.com>”), which fulfils A.1. Emails are not 
verified using DKIM or SPF. There is only a warning if the “return-path” field does 
not match the sender address. Since this information may be forged, there are no 
other security indicators of authenticity for non-signed emails that are received. The 
user's identity is not verified before creating an account (A.3 fails) and the user is 
authenticated by password. 
Email integrity (I) and confidentiality (C) are in general (Due to space constraints we 
only consider the case where PGP is in place while there are some usability problems 
with the implementation of the Question/Answer based encryption.) ensured under 
the assumption that Hushmail is trustworthy (Tr). It is possible for the user to verify 
message integrity also using its own trusted software and verifying the keys using 
out-of-bounds data. Since it operates using open standards and can send standard 
insecure email, all interoperability criteria are fulfilled. The main usability problem 
is the lack of adequate metaphors for cryptographic operations (U.2) and the 
communication with users without Hushmail account. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed criteria, which a usable and secure email system should 
ideally ensure. The list only contains the most important security and usability 
requirements due to space limit, but more should be considered on the development 
of an ideal solution. We applied these criteria to email security techniques and also to 
existing email providers while discussing different groups of email providers 
including a combination with available security techniques as add-on. None of them 
ensures all the requirements. 
Closed and web-based systems like Hushmail are more usable, but they do not 
provide end-to-end security, as one needs to trust the provider. On the other hand, the 
consequences of solutions based on security add-on for standard email services are 
hard trust decisions for the user. It also takes a while to set up these systems. In 
addition, trust in this security technique is also required, as the average user cannot 
develop this on its own.  The Opportunistic Encryption approach is also more usable, 
however it does not offer authentication. Approaches similar to Hushmail also have 
the benefit that secure email can be used from any computer while the PGP/SMIME 
add-ons require you to carry the key in a secure way. The main disadvantage of DE-
Mail/EPostbrief is that these are closed systems, i.e. it is not possible to 
communicate electronically with people who do not have such an account, and you 
need to pay for each email. While with Hushmail it is possible to communicate with 
people who do not have Hushmail both in a secure and insecure way, there are still 
some security and usability problems in the implementation. 
For future work, we propose to merge these approaches. Combine systems like 
Hushmail with Opportunistic Encryption to hide the PKI and other security trust 
decisions even more from the user. Registration should be based on in person 
identification and authentication. Authentication should be based on two-factor 
authentication at the least. The type of authentication used by the sender should be 
provided to the receiver. While the key should be generated at the user's side, the 
email provider could store the encrypted key to make it accessible from any 
computer. Key management, distribution, and revocation could be based on 
S/MIME, but operated by the mail servers rather than a third party CA. 
Communication to users without such an account could be based on an improved 
implementation of the Hushmail approach. 
The biggest challenge seems to be on usability aspects, especially on trust decisions 
that the receiver needs to take. Future work should consider this carefully and reduce 
the necessary trust decisions. The software on the client side must be prepared to 
offer clear information about the security and trustworthiness of an email, so the user 
can decide how to react to the content of the message. The same applies for sending 
a message, the sender should be provided with enough information about how secure 
the delivery process will be. 
The proposed criteria focus on aspects that may facilitate the decision of the receiver 
about the trustworthiness of an email. If we are able to securely authenticate the 
origin of an email, we can also use this information for spam filtering and also to 
display more precise and contextualized warnings e.g. regarding phishing emails and 
dangerous attachments. 
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